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APPRAISAL LITIGATION EXPENSES
is in order, whether it be through judicial reconstruction of the removal
statute with an eye toward policy considerations prominent in this day, or
through act of Congress.
JOHN WOODWARD DE-Es
Income Taxation-Nondeductibility of Appraisal Litigation Expenses
In two recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that litigation expenses incurred by either individual stockholders1 or a
corporation2 in a statutory appraisal proceeding to value shares of dis-
senting shareholders were not deductible as nonbusiness3 or business4 ex-
penses. The holdings in Woodward v. Commissioner5 and United States
v. Hilton Hotels Corp.6 resolved conflicting results reached earlier by the
eighth7 and seventh' circuits in essentially similar fact situations. The dis-
allowance of the claimed deductions in these cases may have significant
impact upon future corporate decisions regarding proposed alterations of
their corporate structures when there is a substantial likelihood of ap-
praisal proceedings being instituted. Moreover, the character of the
appraisal remedy itself as a protective device for the interests of dissenting
shareholders may be affected by the decisions.
In Woodward, taxpayers owning a majority of stock in a publishing
firm voted to extend the corporation's finite charter. The minority stock-
holder voted against the extension and, pursuant to Iowa law,9 majority
taxpayers negotiated to purchase the minority's stock interest. Following
1Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
2 United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
3 INT. IEV. CODE of 1954, § 212 [hereinafter cited as § 212] provides in general:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses ... (1) for the production or collection of
income; (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held for the production of income; or (3) in connection with the deter-
mination, collection, or refund of any tax.
'IT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a) [hereinafter cited as § 162] permits the
deduction of all ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses.397 U.S. 572 (1970).
0397 U.S. 580 (1970).
Woodward v. Commissioner, 410 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1969).
' Hilton Hotels Corp. v. United States, 410 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1969).
' IowA CODE ANN. §491.25 (1949), provides that the majority shareholders
voting for renewal "shall have three years from the date such action for renewal
was taken in which to purchase and pay for the stock voting against such renewal."
Although the Iowa statute would characterize the action taken by the majority
stockholders as a "renewal," in essence the action involved the creation of a per-
petual corporation from a fitite one.
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unsuccessful efforts to value the stock, taxpayers initiated appraisal pro-
ceedings in state court. Eventually the stock was purchased by the majority
at a price determined in the appraisal proceeding.10
When taxpayers sought to deduct over twenty-five thousand dollars
paid to attorneys, accountants, and appraisers, the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue characterized the amounts as capital expenditures that were
"incurred in connection with the acquisition of capital stock of a corpora-
tion"11 and disallowed the claimed deductions. The ruling was affirmed
by the Tax Court 12 and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.'"
In Hilton the taxpayer corporation, owning approximately ninety per
cent of the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, voted to merge the corporations. 4
Prior to the vote, a minority of Waldorf shareholders filed their objec-
tions to the merger and demanded payment for their shares in accordance
with New York Stock Corporation Law.'5 Hilton consummated the
merger and made a cash offer to the dissenters. The offer was rejected
by the dissenters who then began appraisal proceedings in state court, as
provided for by section 91 of the New York Stock Corporation Law.' 0
A settlement was agreed to by the parties and approved by the court.'7
Hilton sought to deduct consulting fees, legal expenses, and expendi-
tures for other professional services in connection with the appraisal pro-
ceeding. As in Woodward, the Commissioner disallowed the deductions,
asserting that they were capital expenditures."3 Following payment of the
tax and filing of suit for refund by Hilton, the district court ruled that the
10 397 U.S. at 573.11 Id.
" Fred Woodward, 49 T.C. 377 (1968).
1 Woodward v. Commissioner, 410 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1969).
1L397 U.S. at 582.
15 Section 91 enabled a stockholder who voted against consolidation to demand
an appraisal to determine the fair market value of his shares and to have the shares
paid for pursuant to section 21. Ch. 359, § 7 [1937] N.Y. Sess. L. 936, now em-
bodied in N.Y. Bus. Coup. LAW § 623(c) (McKinney 1963). Section 21 of the
New York Stock Corporation Law provided:
(6) Any stockholder demanding payment for his shares shall have no right
to receive any dividends or distributions payable to holders of such stock of
record after the close of business on the day next preceding the date of the
stockholders' vote in favor of the action to which such objection was made,
and upon such vote shall cease to have any other rights of a shareholder of
the corporation in respect to such stock, except the right to receive payment
for the value thereof.
Ch. 647, § 6 [1950] N.Y. Sess. L. 1504, now embodied in N.Y. Bus. Corp. LAW
623(e) (McKinney 1963).Ch. 359, § 7 [1937] N.Y. Sess. L. 936.
1? 397 U.S. at 582.
18Id.
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appraisal litigation expenses were deductible. 9 Its decision was affirmed
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals."0
Four factual differences can be discerned in the two cases. First, the
type of underlying transaction in Woodward was an extension of a finite
charter to a perpetual one; Hilton involved a statutory merger. Second,
the laws of the two situs states differed with regard to the time when title
to the dissenters' stock is deemed to have passed. Under Iowa law, title
of the stock did not pass until after the price had been determined by
the parties or in the appraisal proceeding.2 New York law, however, pro-
vides that title passes as soon as the minority registers its dissent, at which
point the dissenters become creditors of the acquiring company for the
fair value of their stock.22 Third, in Woodward the individual majority
stockholders were required to purchase the dissenter's interest," whereas
in Hilton the corporation acquired the minority's shares.24 Finally, de-
ductions in the two cases were sought under different sections of the
Internal Revenue Code. Individual taxpayers in Woodward sought to
deduct appraisal expenses as nontrade or nonbusiness expenses under
section 212. The Hilton corporation claimed deduction of its appraisal
litigation expenses as ordinary and necessary business expenses under sec-
tion 162.
Upon review, the Supreme Court disallowed the claimed deductions in
both cases. The principal holding was delivered in Woodward in which
Mr. Justice Marshall began by noting that capital expenditures were not
deductible under either section 212 or section 162,25 sections of the Internal
Revenue Code that had been judicially declared to be in pari materia.2
" Hilton Hotels v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
20 410 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1969).
2 1See note 9 mipra.
* See note 15 supra; see also 397 U.S. at 583.
'IowA CODE ANx. § 491.25 (1949).
O" See note 16 supra.
21 397 U.S. at 574; INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 263 (a) [hereinafter cited as
§ 263], provides generally that no deduction will be allowed for capital expenditures.
TREAs. REG. § 1.263(a)-(b) (1958), defines capital expenditures as "amounts paid
or incurred (1) to add to the value, or substantially prolong the useful life, of prop-
erty owned by the taxpayer, such as plant or equipment, or (2) to adapt property
to a new or different use."
2 397 U.S. at 575, n.3; cf. Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 373 (1944).
The significance of this statement is that the fact of deduction being sought in one
case under section 162 and in the other under section 212 is of no consequence since
Congress provided the nonbusiness deduction in 1941 to afford individual taxpayers
the same opportunities to deduct certain expenses from gross income that had been
available to corporate taxpayers. Id. at 373-74, citing H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th
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He then proceeded to state that any costs incurred in the acquisition or
disposition of a capital asset were capital in nature, including such an-
cillary expenses as legal and accounting fees 27 Mr. Justice Marshall re-
jected the "primary purpose" test as a standard for determining whether
the costs were to be considered as "incurred in the acquisition or dis-
position of a capital asset.128 This test had been adopted by the seventh
circuit in Hilto29 and two lower courts in other cases involving deduc-
tions for appraisal litigation expenses." Instead of asking whether the
Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 74-76 (1944); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 87-88(1944).
" 397 U.S. at 575-76; see also Spangler v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 913 (9th Cir.
1963) (taxpayer's litigation expenses in recovering property sold upon fraudulent
inducement held to be capital expenditures); United States v. St. Joe Paper Co.,
284 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1960) (taxpayer's legal expenses following acquisition of
stock in company about to reorganize held to be part of stock's cost and capital in
nature). See generally 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION§§ 25.25, 25.26, 25A0, 25A.15 [hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
28 397 U.S. at 577. The "primary purpose" test was first developed with reference
to TREAs. REG. § 1.263(a)-2(c) (1958), which requires expenditures incurred in
"defending or perfecting title to property" to be capitalized. Strictly construed, this
regulation would require the capitalization of any litigation expenses since title
may be conceivably affected in virtually any suit against a taxpayer. Convinced
that Congress did not intend such a fate for all legal expenses, the courts determined
that such expenses be capitalized under the regulation only when the taxpayer's
"primary purpose" in the litigation was to defend or perfect title to property.
See Rassenfoss v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1946).
20410 F.2d at 196.
"Vermont Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 682 (D. Vt.
1969); Smith Hotel Enterprises, Inc. v. Nelson, 236 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1964).
But see Boulder Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 512 (W.D. Okla. 1954).
If the "primary purpose" test were applied to Woodward and Hilton, the expendi-
tures would probably be deductible. The "primary purpose" tests asks simply what
chiefly motivated or prompted the taxpayer to incur the expenditure in question.
If the expenditure was not incurred in order to effect the acquisition of a capital
asset, the expenses would be deductible. Here both underlying transactions had
been completed prior to the initiation of appraisal proceedings. Taxpayers arguably
incurred the appraisal litigation expenses and acquired the dissenters' shares only
because of statutory requirements. Indeed, the appraisal proceedings could have
been avoided if dissenters and the taxpayers in each case had been successful in
negotiating the value of the former's shares. Thus, it could not be argued that
the appraisal proceedings were necessary to complete either the renewal in Wood-
ward or the merger in Hilton. The appraisal remedy aims at the establishment
of a fair value for dissenters' shares. See note 56 infra. Accordingly, taxpayers in
Woodward and Hiltonr should be able to argue successfully that the "primary pur-
pose! of incurring the appraisal expenses was not to complete a capital transaction or
to acquire a capital asset, but only to establish the "fair value" of dissenters' stock,
which under Iowa and New York law the majorities and acquiring corporation were
required respectively to purchase. The expenditures would then be deductible. See,




primary purpose of the expenditure was to acquire a capital asset, the
Court held that the proper inquiry looked to the "origin and character
of the claim.""1 If the expenses in question originated in the process of
acquiring or disposing of a capital asset, the expenses must be capitalized.
The Court reasoned that since the establishment of the purchase price,
herein accomplished by the appraisal court, was clearly part of the process
of acquisition, it followed that the appraisal litigation expenses were part
of the stock's cost and had to be capitalized.3
The Court in Hilton primarily relied upon Woodward to rule that
the appraisal expenses were nondeductible. The taxpayer had argued that
the expenses could not be regarded as part of the process of acquisition
since, under New York law, unlike the Iowa law governing the parties in
Woodward, title had already passed to the acquired corporation before
appraisal proceedings commenced. The Court in Hilton rejected this
argument, saying that the "functional nature of the appraisal remedy as
a forced purchase of the dissenters' stock is the same, whether title
passes before or after the price is determined.""
The Supreme Court's disallowance of appraisal litigation cost deduction
in Woodward and Hilton regrettably leaves many questions unanswered.
The Court correctly noted in Woodward that expenses incurred in con-
nection with the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset had to be
capitalized.3 4 What the Court was really called upon to decide is how
sufficiently related to a capital acquisition or disposition an expense
must be before it is deemed to be incurred in connection with the acquisi-
tion or disposition and is therefore required to be capitalized. Will deduc-
tion problems of this nature be resolved by determining if the expenditure
in question was incurred in order to effect the acquisition or disposition of
a capital asset, i.e., if such an objective was the taxpayer's "primary pur-
pose?"'35 Or will a more indirect causal relationship between the expense
and capital acquisition or disposition require the capitalization of the
former? The Court in Woodward adopted the latter approach.
As previously stated, the Court concluded in Woodward that an
"origin and character" test should be used to determine the deductibility
' 397 U.S. at 578. The Court relied on United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39
(1963).32 397 U.S. at 579.
8I Id.
,Id. at 575.
"See note 28 supra.
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tion of a capital asset. 8 Such a test looks to the "origin and character"
of the expenditure, rather to its "primary purpose." Rejecting the "pri-
mary purpose" test as too uncertain for such tax problems, the Court pre-
ferred the "simpler inquiry whether the origin of the claim litigated is in
the process of acquisiton itself."' 37 The Court relied upon United States
v. Gilmore,8 in which expenses of defending a divorce suit were dis-
allowed because the claim stemmed from the marital relationship and not
from the conservation of income-producing assets.39
The genesis of the "origin and character" type of analysis for tax
problems may be found in Lykes v. United States,40 in which a taxpayer
was not allowed to deduct litigation expenses incurred in contesting the
amount of his federal gift tax under section 212 because the expense was
attributable to the gifts and not to the conservation of his income-
producing assets.41 The Court in Lykes reasoned that since the litigation
expenses would not have arisen but for the gift and those expenses could
be traced to the gift for their origin, the expenses were of a personal
nature and could not be deducted.' Applying the type of causal analysis
employed in Lykes to Woodward and Hilton, the appraisal litigation
expenses would be regarded as originating in the process of acquiring the
dissenters' shares, and since such acquisition is of a capital character, the
expenses would not be deductible.
43
The problem with an "origin and character" type of analysis was
suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent in Lykes:
A majority of my brethren think they can escape this conclusion by
going further back in the chain of causation. They can say the cause
of this legal expense was the gift. Of course one can reason, as my
brethren do, that if there had been no gift there would have been no
tax, if there had been no tax, there would have been no deficiency, if
there were no deficiency there would have been no contest, if there were
no contest there would have been no expense. And so the gifts caused
" 397 U.S. at 577.
3' Id.88 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
"Id. at 51.
,343 U.S. 118 (1952).
,Id. at 125.
"The specific holding of Lykes was overruled by Congress through an amend-
ment of section 212 in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, but the causal analysis
employed by the majority in that decision has survived. Snyder, The Impact of
Supreme Court Decisions of the Deduction of Legal Fees, 23 TAx LAW. 339, 342
(1970).
"See 397 U.S. at 577.
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the expense. The fallacy of such logic is that it would be just as possible
to employ it to prove that the lawyer's fees were caused by having
children. If there had been no children, there would have been no
gift .... If this reasoning were presented by a taxpayer, what would
we say of it? 4
Accordingly, it can be seen that the "origin and character" test of necessity
involves a highly subjective causal exploration in tax situations where the
issue is whether litigation expenses arose from personal activities of the
taxpayer. Prior to Woodward and Hilton, this test had not been extended
to cover tax problems involving expenses allegedly incurred in the process
of acquiring or disposing of a capital asset.
It would appear that the same problems of unpredictable causal ex-
plorations and likelihood of inconsistent results that were pointed to by Mr.
Justice Jackson in Lykes will likely surround the extended application
of the "origin and character" test to tax questions similar to those pre-
sented in Woodward and Hilton. For example, it is well-established that
expenses of a complete liquidation, including legal and accounting fees,
are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.45 But sup-
pose that the Lykes-Gilmore type of analysis (now that of Woodward and
Hilton) is applied to determine the deductibility of liquidation expenses.
If the origin of the corporation's decision to liquidate can be traced to
a personal dispute between two principal shareholders or to some other
personal reason, the "origin and character" test would disallow deduction
of hitherto unquestionably deductible expenses. Courts have permitted
the deduction of liquidation expenses on the theory that no capital asset
was being created or continued,46 although liquidation does involve a dis-
position of capital assets. But if the "origin and character" type of
analysis is valid for tax questions such as those raised in Lykes-Gilmore
and now Woodward-Hilton, there is no reason not to apply it to liquidation
and other tax problems. Such application would require tax courts to
make a subjective search for the origin of any transaction giving rise to
expenses of questionable deductibility. It would appear then that the
Court's adoption of the "origin and character" test for the problems posed
in Woodward and Hilton portends increasing uncertainty for the taxpayer
and increasing tax litigation for the courts. The Court in Woodward
"343 U.S. at 128.
" Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965); Gravois
Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962).
" Gravois Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199, 206 (8th Cir.
1962), citing 4 MERTENS § 25.35.
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fails to justify its rejection of the alternative "primary purpose" test. The
Court's approach is especially questionable in view of the fact that there
have been a number of cases involving expenditures connected with the
acquisition or disposition of a capital asset that have been resolved by
analysis that focuses on the purpose of the expenditure rather than its
"origin and character. ' 47
Another question emerging in the wake of the decisions concerns the
possibility of an argument by the taxpayer in the Woodward fact situation
that the appraisal litigation expenses are deductible as organizational
expenditures under section 248 of the Internal Revenue Code.48 Applying
the "origin and character" test adopted by the Court, the expenses of the
appraisal proceeding could be said to lie in the extension of the corporate
charter by the majority shareholders. Since that transaction essentially
resulted in the creation of a perpetual corporation from a finite one, the
ensuing appraisal expenses should arguably be deductible as organizational
expenses under section 248."9
,' See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. United States, 347 F.2d 275, 305 (Ct. Cl.
1965); Gravois Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962);
see especially Campbell v. Fields, 229 F.2d 197, 203 (5th Cir. 1956), in which the
taxpayer incurring litigation and surveying charges incident to the establishment
of unitization, pooling, and operating agreements between himself and other gas
and oil lessees, was allowed to deduct such expenses because they had not been for
the purpose of acquiring a capital asset but to satisfy a requirement of a state
regulatory commission. This case would appear to support an argument that if the
"primary purpose" test were applied to the facts in Woodward and Hilton, the
appraisal expenses would be deductible, in view of the fact that the proceeding was
required by state law. See, Comment, Deductibility of Appraisal Litigation Ex-
penes, 70 COLUm. L. R!v. 538, 550 (1970). See also Straub v. Granger, 143 F.
Supp. 250 (W.D. Pa. 1956) (legal expenses paid for advice given on ways to
preserve taxpayer's interest in a closely held corporation held deductible, even
though a majority of the corporation's stock was acquired pursuant to such
advice). The district court in Straub noted that the legal expenses were "regarded
properly in relation to the purpose for which taxpayers obtained counsel rather
than to the increased ownership which resulted." Id. at 254. "Primary purpose"
was held to be the governing test there and "the fact that the taxpayers' ownership
in the corporation was increased partly through the services of counsel does not
establish that counsel was paid for acquiring stock." Id. at 255.
"' INT. Rnv. CoDn of 1954, § 248(a) provides that organizational expenditures
of a corporation may be treated as deferred expenses and deducted ratably from
gross income. Section 248(b) defines an organizational expenditure as one which
"(1) is incident to the creation of the corporation (2) is chargeable to capital
account; and (3) is of a character which, if expended incident to the creation of
a corporation having a limited life, would be amortizable over such life." TREAS.
REG. § 248-1(b) (2) (1956), adds that "legal services incident to the organization
of the corporation" are organizational expenditures.
" 49 Such an argument would not be available to the taxpayer in Hilton since the
original transaction was a reorganization which clearly requires capital treatment.
[Vol. 49
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Unfortunately the opinions in Woodward and Hilton do not discuss
the tax consequences of the holdings for the corporate taxpayer. The
Court in Woodward does note that capital expenditures "are added to
the basis of the capital asset with respect to which they are incurred,
and are taken into account for tax purposes either through depreciation or
by reducing the capital gain (or increasing the loss) when the asset is
sold."150 For the taxpayer in the Hilton situation, it would appear that the
appraisal expenses may never be taken into account for tax purposes. Any
stock is nondepreciable, for it is an intangible asset with an unlimited
life."1 Following the merger, Hilton can either put the costs of the
appraisal proceeding as an addition to good will or attempt to apply the
costs to adjust the basis of tangible assets it acquired from Waldorf-
Astoria. The Commissioner would be certain to insist that these capital
expenditures be accorded the former treatment, arguing that the acquiring
Hilton corporation increased the intangible benefits flowing to it from
the Waldorf corporation by increasing its own percentage of stock hold-
ings as a consequence of the appraisal proceeding. Even if the taxpayer
were able to argue successfully for the application of appraisal costs to
an adjustment of the basis of tangible assets it acquired from the Waldorf
entity, a highly complicated allocation problem would remain. With either
treatment, the taxpayer is unlikely to realize any tax benefit from the
capital expenditures. The Hilton corporation will be able to recover the
costs of the appraisal proceeding only upon liquidation, making it prob-
able that any tax advantage of an adjusted basis will never be realized.
Another problem concerns the Court's rejection of Hilton's -argument
that the appraisal costs should be regarded as obligations of the acquired
Waldorf corporation which the acquiring Hilton corporation assumed
and satisfied as ordinary and necessary expenses. The Court briefly noted
that since Hilton had conceded that the purchase price of the dissenters'
shares was a capital outlay, it could not successfully argue that the ap-
praisal costs belonged to the Waldorf corporation.52 The Court's arbi-
trary dismissal of taxpayer's argument is clearly unsatisfactory. If the
"origin and character" test is applied to Hilton, the appraisal costs may
be seen to have originated as a consequence of Waldorf's statutory obliga-
tion to pay the dissenting shareholders the fair value of their shares,
i.e., the appraisal expenses arose in connection with an obligation of the
" 397 U.S. at 574-75; see also TREAS. REG. § 1.1001-1 (a) (1957).
" TREAS. REG. § 1.16 7(a)-3 (1956).
11 397 U.S. at 584-85.
1971].
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disappearing corporation. Hilton, as the acquiring corporation, assumed
the obligations of paying the purchase price of the dissenters' shares and
paying the accompanying costs of the appraisal proceeding. The latter
expenses may be regarded as closely analogous to clearly deductible liquida-
tion expenses."m As is the case with a liquidating corporation, Waldorf
will cease to exist as a corporate entity following the merger. What the
acquiring Hilton corporation is doing in paying the costs of the appraisal
proceeding (which initially arose as a part of Waldorf's statutory obliga-
tion to pay the dissenters for their shares) 4 is essentially the same process
involved when a liquidating corporation pays or satisfies its debts and
obligations. Here the obligation has merely been transferred to the Hilton
corporation in the course of the merger. There would appear to be little
reason for according transactions having essentially the same juridical
effect differing tax treatment.
In Woodward it is uncertain whether the capital asset with respect
to which the expenditures in question were incurred is only the stock
acquired from the dissenters or is all of the taxpayers' stock in the corpora-
tion. The issue then is which stock will receive an adjustment in basis.
The Court reasoned that the appraisal expenses arose as part of the
process of acquisition and had to be capitalized. Since majority stock-
holders in Woodward incurred the expenses of the appraisal proceeding
in the course of a transaction which undoubtedly affected the "character"
of their pre-extension stock interests, could not such expenses be regarded
as incurred with respect to all of the stock in the corporation and not just
that acquired from the dissenters? In this event, the taxpayers in Wood-
ward would be entitled to a basis boost on all their stock in the corporation.
The decision in Woodward affords little guidance to this problem of basis
adjustment. The only tax consequence that is clear is that whatever stock
is benefited by the increase in adjusted basis, the benefit will be realizable
only upon an inter vivos disposition of the shares. As an intangible asset
with an unlimited life, the stock is nondepreciable, and there is no other
asset to which a basis boost can be applied.
Woodward and Hilton could well result in a change in the availability
of the appraisal remedy itself as a protective device for the interest of the
" See note 45 spra.
" The Court itself noted that establishment of the purchase price of a capital
asset was part of the process of acquisition. See text preceding note 32 supra.
It would follow from this that the appraisal expenses were part of Waldorf's obliga-
tion to pay to the dissenters the fair value of their shares.
[Vol. 49
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dissenting minority shareholder upon future corporate alterations. The
appraisal remedy may be regarded as the "quid pro quo for statutes giving
the majority [stockholders] the right to override the veto which previously
the holder of even one share could exercise against mergers, sales of all
assets, and other basic corporate changes."" The appraisal proceeding is
designed to protect the investment of the minority shareholder by assuring
that he receives a "fair value" for his interest in the corporation."6
In order to determine such "fair value," parties are usually required
to make considerable expenditures in paying for legal, accounting, and
consulting services. Since legislatures and courts generally have failed
to provide for an apportionment of appraisal costs,57 the average investor,
"faced with outlays disproportionate to the value of his holdings," ' is
often handicapped in asserting his appraisal rights. Woodward and Hilton
would appear to impose an additional burden on the dissenting seller by
requiring his share of the appraisal costs, like those of the purchasing
majority, to be capitalized and not deducted. Although neither opinion so
states explicitly, the early Tax Court decision of Heller v. Commissioner,9
allowing the seller to deduct his appraisal costs, is overruled by implica-
tion. Such a tax consequence could well revert the dissenter to his un-
fortunate position before the enactment of appraisal statutes when "the
minority was pretty well stuck with the new investment if the required
statutory majority approved the deal."6
Following Woodward and Hilton, a significant possibility exists that
corporations contemplating merger may opt to forego such a reorganization
when faced with the nondeductibility of appraisal costs and the likelihood
of appraisal proceedings being instituted by a minority of its own share-
holders or by a minority of the newly-acquired corporation. Instead,
corporations faced with such a prospect may elect to effect a tax-free
acquisition of assets, in which the acquiring corporation exchanges its own
" Vorenburg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Right,
77 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1194 (1964).
"' Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HAv. L.
REv. 1453, 1456 (1966).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(e) (1965), provides: "The court shall assess the
cost of said proceedings as it shall deem equitable."
"Note, Appraisal of Corporate Dissenters' Shares: Apportioning the Proceed-
ing's Financial Burdens, 60 YALE L.J. 337, 341 (1951).
Joseph Heller, 2 T.C. 371 (1943), aft'd, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1945).
'
0 Doar, Protection of Minority Shareholders' Rights: Consolidation, Merger,
and Sale of Assets, 33 Wis. BAR BULL. 29, 34 (Aug., 1960).
19711
I NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
stock or securities for all or part of another corporation's assets.01 With
the latter type of reorganization, the shareholders of the acquiring corpora-
tion have no recourse to the appraisal remedy under the law of most
jurisdictions; and, in one-quarter of the states, even the shareholders of the
acquired corporation cannot invoke the appraisal remedy.0 2 Thus it appears
that Woodward and Hilton could seriously impair the effectiveness of
statutory appraisal remedies as protective devices for the interests of the
minority shareholder.
E. CADER HOWARD
Labor Law-Issuance of Injunction to End Strike in Breach of
Arbitration Agreement
Since the turn of this century, Congress and the United States Su-
preme Court have endeavored to balance the respective powers of labor
and management. Whenever the scales tipped more favorably towards one
group than the other, the reaction has been to establish equilibrium either
legislatively or judicially. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
7701 is a striking example of this balancing process. The Supreme Court
held that a federal district court could enjoin a strike in breach of a col-
lective bargaining agreement despite section four of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, which prohibits the granting of federal injunctions in labor-manage-
ment disputes. Significantly, the Court reversed Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson,2 in which it had held to the contrary. Boys Markets points up
the unfortunate situation produced by the interaction of the Norris-
LaGuardia8 and Taft-Hartley Acts.'
Norris-LaGuardia was occasioned by the massive intervention of the
judiciary into labor-management relations.' Prior to its enactment, a
strike seemingly was labor's most potent weapon; however, management
a" INT. PV. CODE, of 1954, § 354(a) (1) provides: "No gain or loss shall be
recognized if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are,
in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities
in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization."2 13A B. Fox & E. Fox, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CORPORATE AcgnsiroNs
AND MERGERS § 2501[2] (1970).
1398 U.S. 235 (1970).
2370 U.S. 195 (1962).
*29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
'29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1964).
'See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTiON
(1932).
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